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Abstract
Collective pension arrangements tend to yield higher risk-adjusted pension benefits than individual
plans due to intergenerational risk sharing and the lack of annuity conversion risk. These benefits
pose the implicit assumption that the pension fund has an infinite horizon, while we observe that
many pension funds discontinue. Using case studies of six discontinued pension funds, in combination
with a simulation model, this paper analyses the occurrence and impact of pension fund discontinuity.
Although discontinuity tends to increase the volatility of pension benefits, median benefits in most
institutional settings increase after discontinuing the fund. We find that both the occurrence and
impact of discontinuity depends strongly on the institutional setting of the pension fund. Stricter
regulations, such as more conservative discount rates, increase the financial stability of the pension
fund; however, they may reduce membership support through lower replacement rates. This poses a
trade-off in the design of the pension system.
∗We thank Maurits Aben, Jurre de Haan and Adri van der Wurff for their useful comments and the Dutch pension funds
association (Pensioenfederatie) for providing a list of discontinued pension funds
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1 Introduction
Several European countries have experienced a decline in the number of pension funds in the past decade.
During the period 2005-2015, the number of pension funds declined 60% in the Netherlands and Denmark,
52% in the United Kingdom, 33% in Switzerland, 27% in Norway, and 4% in Germany (OECD, 2015).
The pension fund decline in these countries is the result of mergers, closures, and liquidations (with
a transfer to a different entity) of pension funds. Sometimes, it is in the interest of plan members to
discontinue the fund, as continuation may result in lower or more volatile benefits. However, closing the
plan may impose risks as well, such as a conversion risk caused by continuation with another pension fund.
The discontinuation of a substantial number of pension funds raises the question of whether discontinuity
poses a risk to the stakeholders of the pension fund and, in particular, to the members of the pension
funds.
A discontinuity event can be a risk to pension fund members because risks that are meant to be shared
between generations (intergenerational risk sharing) may all fall upon the last generation present in the
pension fund at the moment of discontinuity. When rights are not transferred to a different entity, the
last generation will become residual claimants, increasing rather than decreasing the riskiness of their
pension benefits. The possibility that an existing pension fund might go into runoff (i.e., closure of the
fund to all new contributions, while existing rights remain in the pension fund) may discourage new
generations from joining the pension fund, which may trigger a discontinuity event on its own (Beetsma
et al., 2012). Please note that when the pension fund discontinues, the pension plan may continue in a
different entity, in which case the pension fund will not go into runoff. We take the option of runoff as
the default option at a discontinuity event, but we will discuss these alternative options (that give rise
to amongst others conversion risk) at a later stage. While a discontinuity event is likely to increase the
riskiness of pension benefits, it may also release any potential buffers in the pension fund, which may
increase retirement income in the wake of a discontinuity event. Therefore, in this paper we analyse the
impact of discontinuity risk, as pension fund discontinuity can have both a positive and negative effect
on pension fund members.
Discontinuity events in pension funds can be triggered by financial and social circumstances. When the
financial position (i.e., solvency) of a pension fund becomes too weak, financial supervisors or sponsoring
employers may force the pension funds to discontinue. Alternatively, when participation is not mandatory,
present and/or future members can force the pension fund to discontinue (e.g., by leaving the pension
fund) when they lose trust. This can happen when the replacement rate of the pension is lower than
promised or when contributions are too high. However, both triggers are strongly linked. Pension
funds can improve their financial by cutting pension rights, but this will diminish their social position
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(membership trust), as members will face lower benefits. However, at the same time a poor financial
position will also diminish the social position, as members will expect that pensions will not be fully paid
in the future. Therefore, both a strong and weak financial position can undermine the social position
of the fund. The opposite may also hold, as in situations where sponsors and plan members remain
confident, while the fund is underfunded. These situational combinations motivate the case studies that
follow.
Discontinuity can be triggered both internally and externally. Internal triggers (e.g., pension cuts) are at
the discretion of pension fund boards, while external triggers (e.g., bankruptcy of the sponsoring employer)
are not. This creates four different categories of discontinuity triggers. Although discontinuity can have
different triggers, the result is the same: the fund ceases to exist. All members become inactive, and no
new contributions will enter the pension fund. The existing members will remain in the pension fund, now
in runoff, until they die or until their pension rights are transferred (liquidation). As the discontinuity
event does not depend on the type of trigger, in this paper we will analyse a single discontinuity event,
although the financial and social positions at discontinuity will differ.
Discontinuity risk is strongly linked to the institutional setting of pensions. Institutional factors (e.g.,
such as regulations of the discount factor for pension liabilities, the cost structure of pensions, legal
options to cut pensions, and population characteristics) impact the perceived financial position of the
fund, which in turn influences pension fund discontinuity. The extent to which participation in a plan is
mandatory also directly effects discontinuity risk in a pension plan, as it determines whether pension plan
members can leave when they want to and thereby trigger a discontinuity event. This implies that pension
funds with the same asset value and pension liabilities can have different exposures to discontinuity risk,
depending on their institutional setting.
This paper relies upon a stream of recent literature analysing discontinuity risk of collective funded pen-
sion funds, including: Beetsma and Bovenberg (2009); Bovenberg et al. (2007); Bovenberg and Mehlkopf
(2014); Molenaar et al. (2011); and literature discussing intergenerational risk sharing in collective pen-
sion funds, including: Bonenkamp and Westerhout (2014); Chen et al. (2016); Cui et al. (2011); Gollier
(2008); Ponds and Van Riel (2009); Teulings and De Vries (2006). This paper builds on this literature by
explicitly focusing on the occurrence and impact of discontinuity events. We quantify both the occurrence
of discontinuity events and their impact on replacement rates. In addition, we analyse the dependency of
the institutional setting on the occurrence and impact of pension fund discontinuity events. By using a
practical simulation model with a long time period ranging up to 250 years, we can estimate and visualize
the effect of discontinuity on a continuously changing population, with multiple generations. In addition,
it allows us to assess the effect of a number of properties, (e.g. such as accumulation and contribution,
discount rules, cost structures, and life expectancy shocks) on the impact of discontinuity.
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After discussing the theory of discontinuity risk in pension funds, we will describe six recent cases of
pension funds in the Netherlands that have faced a discontinuity event. This will give information about
the causes of discontinuity and the development of relevant indicators of pension funds in runoff, such as
the coverage rate and indexation (i.e., pension funds that have no active members and therefore receive
no new contributions). This information is used to calibrate a simulation model that we will use to both
simulate the occurrence of discontinuity events and development of pension funds after the event.
This paper shows that discontinuity events, both in practice and in theory, are not as infrequent as
intergenerational risk sharing may require (Beetsma et al., 2012). Discontinuity events become relevant
when one considers the long horizons that pension funds have. Pension fund boards give various reasons
that motivate their decision to discontinue, most often citing high costs per member due to a lack of
access to economies of scale. The case study shows that while pension funds choose different ways to
continue the pension plan after discontinuation of the fund, the result is not unilaterally bad for the
members in all cases. The simulation model also shows that discontinuity can have both positive and
negative effects for pension fund members, but the impact depends strongly on the institutional setting
of the pension fund and its members.
2 Theory
2.1 Intergenerational risk sharing
One of the core reasons for collective pension arrangements is the possibility of benefiting from inter-
generational risk sharing. Intergenerational risk sharing allows generations that face long term economic
downturns to be compensated by generations that face better economic times. In this way all generations
face less risk, increasing expected risk-adjusted returns (Bovenberg and Mehlkopf, 2014; Cui et al., 2011;
Gollier, 2008). When economic circumstances are good, part of the excess returns are transferred to
the future by higher buffers, while in the case of economic downturns, benefits will be reduced less than
proportionally by allowing for lower or even negative buffers.
However, for intergenerational risk sharing to work, two requirements have to be met. First, the current
generation should believe that future generations will join the system. Without the future generation,
any deficit present in the buffers will be fully attributed to the new generation, who may be unwilling to
join if they have to make large transfers to older generations (Westerhout, 2011). Second, risks should
be shared symmetrically, in two-sided solidarity. Both negative and positive buffers should be shared;
otherwise, support for intergenerational risk sharing will soon diminish (Ponds, 2003). This requires both
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commitment and restraint from the current generation, especially in the case of economic prosperity.
2.2 Discontinuity risk
Intergenerational risk sharing implicitly assumes that pension funds have an infinite horizon. If a pension
fund doesn’t have an infinite horizon and ceases to exist at a certain point, the previous generation cannot
share the risks with any future generation. If there is no future generation to share risks with, pension
fund members will not be willing to make the expected transfers to older generations if the pension fund
has a deficit (Westerhout, 2011).
The possibility of a discontinuity event decreases the value of risk sharing for pension funds. In practice,
pension funds discontinue on a regular basis (Alserda et al., 2017; Bikker and De Dreu, 2009). For example,
over the period 2005–2015, more than half of Dutch, Danish, and British pension funds discontinued
(OECD, 2015). It is therefore important to analyse discontinuity of pension funds and its implications
for pension fund members.
There are a number of options available for pension plans that discontinue. When rights are not trans-
ferred, a pension plan that discontinues goes into runoff. This implies that no new contributions are paid
to the pension fund and all active members become inactive. The pension fund continues to exist until
the last member dies or the last rights are transferred. A pension fund that goes into runoff is used in the
remainder of this paper to simulate the impact of discontinuity, as this is, contrary to the other options,
not dependent on any negotiations with external parties.
Pension funds have a number of alternative options when they face discontinuation. One option is to
merge with another pension fund, which can be a company pension fund, industry-wide pension fund, or
a general pension fund. This will increase the size of the newly formed pension fund, potentially lowering
costs in the presence of economies of scale and improving the benefits of risk sharing (when there is no
ring fencing, which would otherwise keep risk sharing unchanged).
Another option is to transfer rights to an insurance firm. This will increase the security of pension
rights, as insurance firms are not allowed to cut benefits. However, the premium for collective pension
insurance contracts usually does not allow for indexation, and this increases the inflation risk for the
plan members. When rights are transferred to an insurance company, the total value of the pension’s
entitlements strongly depends on the interest rate. In a low interest rate environment, this option is
very expensive. Thus, the additional security of the insurance company may require a cut in pension
entitlements at the transfer moment.
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2.3 Discontinuity triggers
There are numerous types of discontinuity triggers. We distinguish four types of triggers: internal and
external. Internal triggers originate from within the pension fund itself, while external triggers originate
from outside the influence of the pension fund. Both internal and external triggers can be financial and
social triggers. Financial triggers are related to the financial position, in particular the solvency, of the
pension fund, which will be monitored by financial supervisors, while social triggers are connected to the
trust of members and sponsors, including trade unions.
2.3.1 Internal triggers
Most papers find that collective pension funds, due to the possibility of intergenerational risk sharing,
give higher expected benefits or lower risk (Gollier, 2008; Beetsma and Bovenberg, 2009; Westerhout,
2011). However, if collective pension funds have substantially large negative buffers, individual members
may prefer funds with individual accounts, which by definition have no buffers (Teulings and De Vries,
2006; Bovenberg et al., 2007; Beetsma et al., 2012). This implies that when the negative buffer (which
lowers expected benefits) is large enough and participation is not mandatory, new members are no longer
willing to join the fund and current members apply to leave i.e., the members vote with their feet. The
remaining members can no longer share risks with the next generation and become residual claimants.
The negative buffer can therefore act as a trigger for a discontinuity event.
Another potential internal trigger for a discontinuity event is the replacement rate. Making use of a
survey Binswanger and Schunk (2012), the authors find that members have a minimum level of monthly
spending at retirement below which they do not want to fall. These minimum spending levels, denoted in
relation to working income (the replacement rate), vary strongly between members and between different
income quantiles. However, the authors conclude that the net certainty equivalence value of retirement
income should exceed 70% of net annual working-life income. If the expected replacement ratio decreases
below this threshold (e.g., because current retirees have low pensions, or because future pension cuts
are expected), plan members may no longer be willing to pay the contributions. Pension funds are thus
limited in the amount of pension cuts they can impose that fund members will accept. However, net
replacement rates in general exceed gross replacement ratios due to savings, tax brackets, and owner-
occupied housing (Brady, 2010). Gross replacement rates may thus be somewhat lower (e.g., than 70%),
depending on the tax system in a specific country (e.g., in countries that have lower taxes for retired
individuals).
In the case of a discontinuity event, the last generation present will bear all residual risks1, increasing
1Some risks, like that of setting contributions too low, may disappear, but these are much less in impact.
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rather than decreasing the riskiness of pension benefits. Pensions of this generation will depend very
strongly on the deficit (downside risk) or surplus (upside risk) of the pension plan at the moment of
discontinuity. The very expectation that future generations may be unwilling to participate can therefore
make current generations (i.e., younger workers) unwilling to participate, as they fear becoming the
residual risk bearers. Discontinuity can become a self-fulfilling prophecy: Once future members believe
that it may happen, they will have incentives to trigger it themselves by refusing to join the fund.
2.3.2 External triggers
External triggers are factors outside the pension fund that affect pension fund discontinuity. Although
the factors may originate from outside the pension fund (e.g., asset return, interest rate, inflation, and
changes in life expectancy), they can be mitigated by pension fund management. Applying financial
instruments (hedges) can, for example, mitigate the effect of asset return shocks. Without hedging
these risks, asset return shocks can decrease assets or increase liabilities, resulting in solvency problems
indicated by the coverage rate.
Other external triggers, like changes in life expectancy, can only be hedged at high costs. A change in
life expectancy increases the number of years that pension benefits must be paid. This increases pension
fund liabilities, again decreasing solvency.
Discontinuity can also be triggered by the population. If it is substantially skewed (e.g., when the
population mainly consists of older, retired, members), the pension fund does not fully benefit from the
risk-decreasing effect of new contributions. This makes the financial position more volatile and might put
constraints on the asset allocation. Both the higher volatility and lower flexibility in the asset allocation
makes the pension plan less valuable to the members, making discontinuity more likely. The same is true
if the population size decreases (e.g., because the sponsoring company downsizes or disappears, or the
industry declines or disappears), which will make the financial position more volatile and increase the
effect of fixed costs on pension fund management.
Discontinuity is immediately triggered when the active population disappears in its entirety. This can
happen when the company or industry of that pension fund disappears (e.g., by bankruptcy or merger
of the company, or development of a new industry that makes the old industry obsolete), or when the
company or industry either transfers the pension accumulation to a different provider or discontinues
the pension plan. This will make all the active members inactive, effectively putting the pension fund in
runoff.
Finally, discontinuity can be triggered by regulatory changes. New regulations can either force a pension
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fund to discontinue or make it practically impossible to continue. Examples include more elaborate
reporting standards (e.g., increasing costs per member, especially for smaller funds) and higher board
member competence level standards, thus making it more difficult to fill board positions.
2.4 Modelling discontinuity
Although there are many triggers that effect discontinuity, it always comes down to one of two types. The
first type of trigger is discontinuity due to financial problems. In this case, pension funds become insolvent
when deficits (i.e., liabilities surpass assets) become too high. For this reason, financial supervisors or
the sponsoring company may force pension funds to discontinue, as contributions to restore the financial
position might become too high. The second type of trigger is connected to membership support. If
participation is not mandatory, making support from (future) members uncertain, this may lead to the
exit of current members or decline of new members, which eventually leads to the discontinuation of
the pension fund. Membership support is difficult to measure, but other variables like opt-outs (e.g.,
number of members who refuse participation) and survey responses can be used to measure it. Relevant
causes for declining membership support include expected retirement income (replacement rate) falling
below the acceptable minimum; expected income from other plans (e.g., individual pension plans) giving
higher expected income; riskiness of retirement income becoming too high (i.e., the chance of falling
below the minimum becomes too high); lack of support in the pension fund board; or disagreement
with changes in the plan characteristics. These two causes i.e., financial and social causes) represent a
trade-off in pension fund management. Applying pension cuts, increasing contributions, and increasing
the riskiness of assets improve the (expected) financial position of the pension fund but may lower
membership support and therefore increase the probability of social discontinuity. When, for example,
the number of members becomes very low, increasing the average cost of running the pension plan,
the pension fund can either choose to lower benefits, thus decreasing membership support, or allow the
financial position to deteriorate, which might or might not be a problem, depending on the available
buffer.
In this paper, we leave the possibility of increasing pension contributions out of the analysis. Depending
on local legislation, pension funds in many countries can, or are obliged to, increase contribution levels,
which helps solve solvency problems. However, the maximum level of contributions is often limited,
and increases in contribution levels will lower membership support. In addition, in many countries the
sponsor pays a part of the contributions, increases in the contribution (including repair payments) beyond
a certain point will cause difficulties for the sponsor. Contributions in our model can be assumed to be
set at the maximum accepted level. Therefore, further increases are not an option in the model.
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2.5 Institutional setting
Discontinuity events are highly dependent on the institutional setting of a country. By institutional set-
ting, we refer to regulations, cost structures, population characteristics, and other institutional factors
that may influence pension fund performance. Circumstances that in one setting will lead to a disconti-
nuity event may have no effect in another setting. Therefore, it is important to connect the literature of
discontinuity risk to the institutional setting.
An important institutional property is the calculation of liabilities, particularly the discount rate used
to discount future payouts. Countries like the Netherlands that use a conservative discount factor, will
force pension funds to acknowledge relatively high liabilities, which imply a lower coverage rate. Pension
funds in countries like the United States that allow for higher discount rates will report lower liabilities
and higher coverage rates. This implies that reported solvency may differ from the actual solvency. Two
comparable pension funds (equal actual solvency), though in different countries, one can have reported
solvency problems and face discontinuity, while the other has no solvency problems at all.
The same holds true for the extent to which pension funds are allowed to run coverage deficiencies.
Countries differ in the deficit that pension funds are allowed to run before they have to apply pension
cuts. Furthermore, the size of pension cuts differ, as well as the number of years over which the pension
cut can be divided. When pension cuts are more likely, members will distrust the plan and become
inclined to trigger a discontinuity event. The pace at which pension cuts have to be applied determine
which generation is most affected. Fast pension cuts will impact older pension fund members, but slow
pension cuts will more strongly impact new and younger fund members. Some pension funds (e.g. in
the United States) are not allowed at all to cut pension benefits. These pension funds can continue with
large (implicit) deficits, which can make them look closer to a pay-as-you-go plan than a funded plan.
And while pension cuts may be legally allowed, the willingness of the population to act against it (e.g.,
strike) can still make them very difficult to enact.
The distribution of age categories also influences pension fund discontinuity. Age distributions tend to
differ across countries (e.g., low birth rates) and industries (e.g., disappearing industries). Pension funds
that have relatively many retirees (”sinking giants”) become more vulnerable, as these funds will have
fewer options available to restore the financial position, and any potential deficit present will tend to
magnify for these funds (Frijns, 2010). Therefore pension fund discontinuity becomes more likely.
Another important difference between countries is whether pension fund participation is mandatory.
When pension fund participation is mandatory, members cannot trigger a discontinuity event by leaving
the pension fund. When participation is quasi-mandatory (i.e., mandatory for employees of a certain
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company or industry), members cannot leave the pension fund easily. If they want to leave the pension
fund, they should find another job or motivate social partners or the employer(s) to force a discontinuity
event. As leaving the fund becomes more difficult, discontinuity events are less likely to occur. When par-
ticipation is completely free, members are most likely to leave the pension fund and trigger discontinuity
for the pension fund. In these cases, the fund usually has strong DC-elements.
Finally, the first pillar and taxes can be relevant for discontinuity events. Pension fund members in
countries that have high base pensions and progressive taxes will be less sensitive to differences in their
risk-bearing (e.g., occupational) pension (Alserda et al., 2016). In addition, in some countries taxes and
the base pension tend to be adjusted in line with purchasing power developments. When country-wide
pension benefits decline (e.g., due to an asset return shock), the government can compensate purchasing
power by reducing taxes or by increasing the base pension. In these circumstances, members will be less
inclined to leave the pension fund and performance becomes a relative matter: Pension funds are more
easily able to cut pension benefits as long as other funds also cut pensions.
Table 1: Institutional setting and pension fund discontinuity
Setting Institutional factor
High Low
Membership obligation More difficult for members Members can leave when
to leave the pension fund, they have a better alternative.
making discontinuity less likely. Discontinuity is more likely.
Conservative discount Low discount rate results in Solvency problems are less
rate higher value of liabilities, and likely, but members may
a lower coverage rate. Solvency distrust the financial position
problems are more likely. of the pension fund.
Maximum allowed Pension cuts are less likely, Pension cuts are more likely,
coverage deficiency members will be less inclined alternatives, such as an
to leave the pension fund, individual plan, will become
as replacement rates increase. more attractive in the case of
deficits.
Pace of pension cuts Impact on younger members Young and new members will
is relatively lower, so they are incur more pension cuts,
less likely to leave the pension making them less likely to
fund. continue membership or join.
Fixed costs Pension funds become more Average costs are more
sensitive to population shocks, constant, discontinuity is
discontinuity will become more less likely.
likely.
Height of base pension Volatility and importance Risk-baring pension is more
of risk-baring pension decreases, important and members will
discontinuity is less likely. be sooner inclined to look
for alternatives.
Progressivity of income Volatility in outcomes are Higher volatility for pension
taxes reduced by income taxes. Lower benefits, discontinuity is
volatility reduces discontinuity more likely.
events.
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The impacts of the most important institutional factors on pension fund discontinuity risk are summarized
in Table 1. These factors represent a paradox in pension fund discontinuity. Stricter pension regulations,
like more conservative discount factors, smaller allowed deficits, and faster pension cuts, increase the
financial stability of pension funds. However, at the same time they tend to stimulate pension fund
discontinuity. More conservative discount rates, smaller allowed deficits, and faster pension cuts increase
the probability and size of pension cuts, which will lower membership support. Depending on the freedom
of pension fund members to leave the fund, this may induce a discontinuity event. These kinds of effects
are therefore relevant for pension fund discontinuity. This suggests that a trade-off may exist in pension
fund discontinuity. More stricter regulations will make pension funds more robust, but will lead to lower
perceived solvency, which might trigger discontinuity.
3 Case study
In this section we will analyse six cases of pension funds that faced a discontinuity event. The cases
are selected from a list of discontinuity events in the Netherlands presented by the Dutch pension funds
association (Pensioenfederatie). Cases are selected in order to represent different types of pension funds
that discontinue (i.e., company and industry-wide pension funds) and different reactions to the disconti-
nuity event (i.e., transfer to a company fund, industry-wide fund, general fund, or insurer). Availability
of pension fund data and motivation of choices are also factors in case selection.
The six cases that are selected are the industry-wide pension fund for miners (consisting of Algemeen
Mijnwerkersfonds van de Steenkolenmijnen en Beamtenfonds voor het Mijnbedrijf), the company fund
of Elsevier publishers (Stichting Pensioenfonds Elsevier-Ondernemingen), the industry-wide fund for the
plastic and rubber industry (Bpf Kunststof- en Rubberindustrie, KRI), the company fund of telecom
provider KPN (OPF KPN), the company fund of RBS bank (RBS NL Pension fund), and the company
fund of ING bank (ING Pensioenfonds). The analysis of these case studies is based on the information
retrieved from annual reports and press statements. The information therefore presents stated motiva-
tions, which can leave out other relevant motivations. So, although these case studies (as summarized in
Table 2 give us valuable insight into pension fund discontinuity, we should keep in mind that there might
be other motivations for the discontinuations of the discussed pension funds.
The pension funds for miners (AMF and BMF) went into runoff after the closure of the mines in the
Netherlands in the 70s. During the next few decades, the pension funds continued to exist without active
members while the total number of members decline. By cooperating, they managed to continue their
operation, but the declining membership made their pension fund increasingly expensive to operate. The
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lack of active members put more limitations on their asset allocation. It also made the pension funds
less attractive to industry-wide funds to merge into, as they would not contribute any future members.
Therefore, the choice was made to transfer the pension rights and assets of both funds to the insurance
firm Aegon in 2014. Pension rights were incremented upon transfer, but will not be indexed (or cut) in
the future (AMF-BFM, 2016).
The company fund of Elsevier choose to discontinue because a decreasing number of employees (members),
in combination with more stringent regulations, led to increasing costs. The rights were transferred to
PGB, an industry-wide fund. The alternative, transferring rights to an insurance firm, was considered
too costly due to the low interest rate in 20152016. The sponsoring company made a one-off payment to
get the coverage rate of the liquidated fund equal to the coverage rate of the new fund (PGB) (Stichting
Pensioenfonds Elsevier-Ondernemingen, 2015).
KRI, the industry-wide fund for plastic and rubber companies, formerly insured their pension rights with
an insurance firm. Due to the low interest rate, the company considered it too expensive to renew the
reinsurance contract at the end of 2016 and decided to liquidate the fund. Although the existing rights
are serviced by the same insurance firm, new rights are accrued at a different industry-wide fund (PGB)
(Bpf Kunststof- en Rubberindustrie, 2015).
The fourth case concerns the merger of two company pension funds of KPN. The pension fund Opf
KPN, the fund that services those employees who are not covered by the collective labour agreement,
is liquidated and merged with PF KPN. The main reasons for the merger are simplicity of the pension
scheme and lower costs for fund members. As the two pension funds were very similar to begin with, the
main effect for the members is the lower operating costs (KPN Pensioen, 2015).
After ending its operations in the Netherlands, RBS chose to transfer its pension rights to the relatively
new vehicle of a general pension fund (”Algemeen Pensioen Fonds”). A general pension fund allows a
pension fund to run multiple pension plans, which can, or cannot, be separated from each other (ring
fencing). As all members became inactive after their dismissal by RBS, the pension fund went into runoff.
The prospect of a decreasing membership and higher costs per member put the generous nature of the
pension plan into jeopardy. Therefore, the rights were transferred to a general pension fund, which can
operate multiple pension plans, thereby benefiting from economies of scale while also keeping the generous
nature of the pension plan intact (RBS NL Pension fund, 2015).
In the final case, after separating the banking activities (ING) and the insurance activities (NN) of ING,
the decision was made to discontinue the current pension fund (Pensioenfonds ING) as of January 1, 2014,
and create two new pension funds (ING CDC Pensioenfonds and NN CDC Pensioenfonds) to match the
pension funds with the new companies. Another reason was for the employer to remove the company
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from the responsibility for the financial position of the pension plan, which due to recent regulations
forced the employer to report a liability in its own accounts. As a compensation, ING paid a one-off
contribution to the old pension fund now in runoff. Although these changes increased the probability of
a pension cut in the future, they also improved the financial position of the fund in the short run (ING
Pensioenfonds, 2015).
Table 2 gives an overview of the six cases, including relevant pension fund properties. The table presents
the type of pension vehicle both before and after the discontinuity event. The reasons given for discontin-
uation can be classified into six categories, all of which fall within the external category: (a) A declining
number of realized or anticipated members, (b) the prospect of lower costs per member after discontinu-
ation, (c) regulatory pressure, including restrictions on the asset allocation and increasing difficulties to
find board members, (d) an improved anticipated security of pension benefits, (e) improved simplicity of
the pension plan (i.e., diminishing the amount of overhead) and (f) external pressure from the sponsoring
company. In addition, the anticipated effect of discontinuity for the short and long term and for different
types of members is presented, along with some summary statistics.
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The six cases represent pension funds in the single institutional setting of the Netherlands. In this
setting pension fund participation is quasi-mandatory, as pension fund members are not allowed to leave
the pension fund. Discontinuity events were not triggered by financial problems in any of the cases,
although in many cases the reasons associated with preventing future financial problems are reported. In
most cases costs, often associated with low or decreasing membership, are reported as one of the reasons
for liquidating the pension fund. Also, the effect of increasing regulatory pressure is often cited as a reason
to discontinue, including a decreasing availability of competent and suitable (i.e., ”fit and proper”) board
members, and the risk for the sponsor of being confronted with large deficits of the company pension
fund. These case studies suggest that pension funds discontinue for a variety of reasons such as declining
membership, the prospect of lower average costs and regulatory pressure. These reasons originate from
external pressures, and to address them pension funds are discontinued. Although both the starting and
the end situation differ between pension funds, not one of the discussed pension funds discontinuity events
was unilaterally bad for the pension fund members. In some cases, all members benefited by lower costs
and reduced complexity, while in other cases, the effect depended on whether the status of the member
was active, inactive, or retired. Improving the prospect of pension fund members was often stated as one
of the primary reasons motivating discontinuity, although this can also represent the effort of pension
plan boards to pressure members to leave. Depending on the situation at hand, the discontinuity event
has advantages and disadvantages for different types of members (i.e., active, passive or retired). In the
cases discussed, the prospect of discontinuity should therefore not, on its own, put pressure on members
to leave the pension fund, assuming they were allowed to. However, the dynamics discussed in these cases
may depend on the institutional setting of the pension fund. In the following sections, we will describe
and apply a simulation model to assess the discontinuity risk and the effect of the institutional setting
on the discontinuity risk.
4 Simulation study
The case studies showed that discontinuity does not necessarily negatively affect pension fund members.
However, the effects of pension fund discontinuity are likely to depend on the institutional setting of the
pension fund. Therefore, we apply a simulation model in which we can account for institutional factors
to analyse the occurrence and impact of pension fund discontinuity events. The simulation model is built
on the asset return model of Koijen et al. (2010), using parameter estimates of Draper (2014)2. The
asset returns, interest rates, and inflation that follow from this are used to simultaneously simulate a
collective pension plan and an individual pension plan, so that the benefits from the collective plan can
2Asset returns are simulated using the Tilburg Finance Tool, which can be found via the following URL:
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B50YmOQ9iDtbdWdVYUpWVlFueFU/view?usp=sharing
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be compared with the pension benefit that would follow from an individual account.
For the sake of parsimony we abstracted from country-specific designs of pension plans and created both
collective and individual pension plans that are not dependent on specific, or local, regulations. Also,
for the simulated population, we tried to keep the model as simple as possible in order to keep all the
relevant mechanisms visible. In Section 5.4, we present the most relevant sensitivity analyses, which
describe various institutional settings.
4.1 Population
The simulated population of pension fund members consists of 10,000 individuals that become members
of the pension fund at a randomly estimated year during the simulation. Members join the fund between
the ages of 20 and 60 and are active members for a period of one to 47 years. When members become
inactive (e.g., retire or find a job with a company that has a different pension fund), they continue
as a passive member. Members cannot transfer their pension accumulation to another provider. The
retirement age is fixed at 67 and the members pass away at random ages between 80 and 90. Given these
assumptions, the pension fund has on average 1,050 members during the simulation. All members have
a fixed, inflation-corrected income of $30.000, replacement rates (representing 40 years of membership)
are adjusted for the period that the members are active in the pension fund.
4.2 Collective pension plan
The collective plan takes the form of a collective-defined contribution plan. This means that the sponsor
(employer) does not share the investment risk with the pension fund, but that members share the risk
among themselves (both intra- and intergenerational).
Members receive an inflation-corrected retirement entitlement of 2% of average income for each year that
they are members of the pension fund. The contribution is progressive and is based on the actuarial value
of the new entitlements. The relation between contribution / accumulation and age varies across countries
and pension schemes. We choose contributions that are progressive with age as this is most common and
because this matches the value of contributions to the value of entitlements, giving no redistributions
between age groups. Section 5.4 shows a sensitivity analysis of this choice, by showing the implications
of choosing a constant contribution instead of a progressive contribution. When the coverage rate is
below 85% (i.e., 15% deficit), pension entitlements are lowered. In this case, entitlements are lowered
by the deficit, divided over 10 years (e.g., a coverage rate of 80% means that entitlements are lowered
with 2%, this continues until the coverage rate exceeds 85%). The same mechanism applies to coverage
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rates of over 115% (i.e., 15% surplus), entitlements are in this case increased by the surplus divided
over 10 years. Coverage rates between 85% and 115% imply that there are no increases or decreases in
the entitlements, except indexation3. Pension capital is invested for 40% in equity and for 60% in fixed
income over the entire lifespan4, with a duration of 16 years. Costs are equal to $10 per member and 0.3%
of assets (based on Alserda et al. (2017)). Contributions and asset returns are added to pension capital
(i.e., total assets) while costs and benefits are deducted. Total liabilities consist of the accumulated
benefits discounted with the expected investment return (3.27% + inflation)5, taking the expected years
in retirement for the different age groups into account. Section 5.4 presents the results of alternative
specifications, including discounting with the long-term, 30 year real interest rate. The coverage rate
is equal to total assets divided by total liabilities; as the real interest rate is used in the calculation of
liabilities, this coverage rate represents the real coverage rate. After retirement age and pension cuts and
indexations are calculated, members receive an income equal to their accumulated benefits; however, this
can change from year to year in line with the plan’s indexation policy.
4.3 Individual pension plan
In the individual pension plan, members contribute the same progressive premium to their individual
pension account. During working life, the contributions–together with individual asset returns (using the
same asset allocation)–are added to the pension capital, while costs, which are the same as for collective
plans, are deducted. If pension members become inactive, their contributions stop, but asset returns
and costs remain relevant for their pension capital. At retirement age, the pension capital is converted
to an annuity, based on the expected return6 (using the annuity formula and the general expected life
expectancy at retirement age).
4.4 Time path
Pension plan members join the pension fund in year 1. This implies that the number of members accrues
gradually during the first years. As there are only a few members and no retirees, the coverage rate, and
therefore indexation policy, will be relatively volatile during these first years. This effect evens out while
the pension fund reaches a state in which the number of members joining the fund is approximately equal
to the number of members leaving the pension fund by passing away. We start measuring performance
indices (i.e., replacement rates, coverage rates, volatility of retirement entitlements, and indexation)
from the start, but differentiate between the start-up phase (approximately 100 years) and the stationary
3Real pension cuts that are smaller than the inflation can be considered as partial indexation of nominal pensions.
4A common asset allocation in the Netherlands (Alserda et al., 2016)
5Which follows from Draper (2014); this return is neutral for the different generations in the sample.
6In Section 5.4.2, we analyse the sensitivity of using the actual long-term interest rate
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phase. At year 180, we simulate an external discontinuity event (no correlation with membership support
or the coverage rate); at this time, all active members become inactive and no new members will join
the fund. Although we described four different causes for a discontinuity event (internal or external, and
social or financial), the result is the same: The pension fund goes into run-off, and therefore we model
a single discontinuity event. At this event, all active members become inactive, and no new members
join the fund. During the next few decades, the number of members slowly decreases as members pass
away without new members entering. This holds for both the individual and the collective plan. Years
100–250 will be used to analyse the effect of the discontinuity event.
4.5 Output
A number of performance indices are used in order to analyse the effect of a discontinuity event. The
most important indices are the replacement rate, calculated as the retirement income divided by the final
income and adjusted for a 40-year working period; the development of the coverage rate; the volatility of
retirement entitlements; and indexations.
5 Results
5.1 Development
Before we analyse the discontinuity events, we first discuss the development of the collective pension plan
and the individual pension plan in our simulations. Figure 1 shows the median, 5% and 95% percentiles for
both replacement rates (left axis) following from the collective pension plan and the individual pension
plan, next to the median coverage rate of the collective plan (right axis). The development of the
replacement rates shows a clear distinction between the first 100 years (start-up) and the next 80 years.
In the first period, any excess returns are used to create a buffer. This leads to lower benefits, as part of
the contribution is directed to the buffer instead of directly to benefits (such as in the individual plan).
However, as the coverage rate is close to 100%, returns that are below expectations can still be partly
offset by allowing for deficits. Therefore, volatility of the collective plan in the start-up phase is lower
than that for the individual plan.
After the start-up period, most simulations show moderate buffers, and these pension funds give pension
rights that are close to the planned benefit entitlement of 80% (40 years of 2%). The returns that these
buffers yield lead to a higher median replacement rate for the collective plan compared with the individual
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plan. However, some simulations have accumulated substantial deficits, resulting in significant pension
cuts and reducing the 5% percentile of the collective plan below that of the individual plan. The opposite
occurs at the upside of the distribution. These pension funds have accumulated positive buffers, yielding
higher returns and allowing for increases in entitlements due to profit sharing. We can conclude that
collective pension plans give higher benefits in the long run, but this is at the cost of lower benefits in
the start-up phase and higher long-run volatility. This latter result is surprising, as collective plans, due
to intergenerational risk sharing, are normally expected to yield lower risk, given the expected return.
However, as the results illustrate, the possibility of joining a pension fund with a deficit, and the expected
pension cuts that are associated with this, increases the downside risk of the collective plan beyond that
of the individual plan. After the start-up phase, the collective plan gives substantially higher expected
retirement incomes. By changing the asset allocation or by using financial hedge instruments, part of this
higher result can be used to lower volatility at the cost of lower (expected) return. This way, the general
finding of higher risk-adjusted returns of collective pension plans can remain intact. In this paper, we
leave these options outside the scope of our analysis.
Figure 1: The development of replacement rates
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Notes. Development of replacement rates (left axis) from an individual and a collective plan and the
median coverage rate of the collective plan (right axis). The replacement rates of the individual plan
tend to exceed those of the collective plan for the first 90-100 years as the buffer is accrued, after which
the collective plan tends to give the higher replacement rates due to average positive buffer.
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5.2 Occurrence of discontinuity events
There is a statistically significant relation between the coverage rate in year t and the replacement rate in
year t+N within our period of analysis (years 100-180). This implies that the expected coverage rate at
retirement can, with different degrees of precision, be calculated making use of the present coverage rate.
In our model, the explanatory power of the coverage rate is the largest in the 12-13 years before retirement
(R2 = 70.1%). Shorter periods have less explanatory power because the pension cuts / increases have not
fully set in, due to their gradual application, while for longer periods other factors, such as asset returns,
will diminish the explanatory power of the prediction.
Using a regression analysis, we can estimate the coverage rate at which the expected replacement rate
of the collective pension plan is equal to that of the individual pension plan. The estimation of the
minimum acceptable coverage rate depends on the time lag that we take for the coverage rate. Differences
in time lags lead to different explanatory powers of the estimation, which changes the reliability of the
estimation for the pension fund members. Lower reliability, and therefore higher uncertainty, will make
the member less will to leave the fund, i.e., a higher minimum acceptable coverage rate. The magnitude
of the coefficients of the coverage rate and the intercept, that also change with different time lags, also
influence the minimum acceptable coverage rate. Figure 2 presents the relation between the lead (years
to retirement) and the minimum expected coverage rate. For prospective and actual members who are
within 20 years of retirement, the minimum acceptable coverage rate is between 93.1% and 94.1%. For
younger members further away from retirement, the minimum acceptable coverage rate is lower, down to
85.5% for the youngest members (20 years old).
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Figure 2: Minimum acceptable coverage rate
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Notes. Relation between the years until retirement and the minimum acceptable coverage rate. The
minimum acceptable coverage rate is the highest and most strict for 9-10 years before retirement (94.1%)
and decreases for both shorter and longer periods.
For the average pension fund member (45 years old, 22 years until retirement) the replacement rate can
be estimated with this equation, which follows from the regression analysis:
Replacement ratet+22 = −0.626 + 1.585 ∗ Coverage ratet (1)
Which is equal to the expectation of the replacement rate of the individual plan (average replacement
rate is equal to 84.6%) when the coverage rate is equal to 92.8%. When the real coverage rate falls below
92.8%, most pension fund members will no longer be willing to join, or continue membership in, the
pension fund. When the coverage rate falls below 85.5%, members will prefer an individual plan, wont
be willing to be members of the pension fund, and the pension fund will be in runoff . We will use this
minimum acceptable coverage rate as the point of discontinuity for a pension fund. When we instead use
a power utility function7 with the average risk aversion r = 1.92 (Alserda et al., 2016), we find a slightly
higher average minimum acceptable coverage rate of 93.6%. Incorporating variation in horizon and risk
aversion will again give a lower coverage rate, at which point nobody is willing to join the pension fund.
Another possible trigger for discontinuity is the replacement rate itself. Binswanger and Schunk (2012)
finds that for the majority of members, the minimum replacement rate is above 70%. Pension funds that
have a replacement rate below 70% will therefore be considered insufficient, and members and employers
might not be willing to pay the considerable premiums.
7equal to Ui(Pi) =
P
1−ri
i
1−ri
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In our simulation model, we measure both triggers of internal discontinuity after the start-up period
(t = 100). We find that in 87% of the simulations, after 80 years, the coverage rate drops below 85.5%,
resulting in the members preferring the individual plan over the collective plan. On the other hand,
in 71% of simulations, the replacement rate falls below the acceptable minimum (70%). In both cases,
the triggers occur in our simulation on average once in 15 years. This shows that discontinuity events
are relevant, as well as both of the triggers we describe. This illustrates the trade-off that occurs with
stricter pension regulations. Stricter regulations will lead to more robust financial positions, but will
sooner result in replacement rates that are below the acceptable minimum.
5.3 Impact of discontinuity
We have shown that discontinuity events occur, both in our simulation as in the cases discussed. We
now focus on measuring the impact of discontinuity events. Figure 3 shows the development of the
replacement rate for the collective pension plan, including a discontinuity event. The development for
the first 180 years (0 ≥ N ≥ 180) is equal to that of Figure 1. However, in this case, after 180 years,
the pension fund goes into runoff8, and no new contributions are collected (indicated by a dashed line).
After approximately 245 years, all remaining members have died and no liabilities remain.
This figure shows that both the median (mean) replacement rate and its volatility increase after dis-
continuity. The median replacement is 101% at the point of discontinuity, implying a modest surplus
of 1%. Decreasing membership implies that the remaining members can increasingly benefit from this
surplus, raising the median replacement rate. However, at the same time, in some simulations (49%),
the coverage rate is below 100% at the discontinuity event, implying a deficit. As membership declines,
the absolute size of the deficit means that the relative impact for the members increases. In at least 5%
of the simulations, assets are completely dissolved before all members have passed away. In these cases,
some members will receive no retirement benefits at all. This figure also clearly shows that while median
replacement rates rise, downside risk (indicated by the 5% percentile) also rises substantially. Therefore,
we confirm that uncertainty of pension benefits increases when a discontinuity event occurs9.
For the individual plan, we find a small decrease in the median replacement rate, together with an increase
in the volatility of the replacement rate, although it’s more subtle than that of the collective plan. Both
effects are due to the, on average, shorter contribution periods of the members and relatively higher costs
relative to assets. Due to the discontinuity event, members in both plans stop contributing to the plan
8This can be interpreted as an external discontinuity event; there is no causal relation from the coverage rate to the
discontinuity event
9Please note that in this situation the pension fund is in runoff with the coverage rate at year t = 180. In the case of
discontinuity events because of low coverage rates, the median replacement rate will drop and downside risk will increase
even more
22
earlier. As contributions have a dampening effect on the replacement rate 10, shorter contribution periods
lead to higher volatility of replacement rates.
Figure 3: Development of the replacement rates with a discontinuity event
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Notes. Development of replacement rates from an individual and a collective plan and the median
coverage rate of the collective plan (right axis), including a discontinuity event at year N = 180 (dashes).
Replacement rates are more volatile after discontinuity.
Both the individual and collective plans are affected by the discontinuity event, but the collective plan
is affected to a much larger degree, as the collective plan, in contrary to the individual plan, allows
for deficits and surplus, which tend to be released at discontinuity. Median (and average) replacement
rates rise substantially for the collective plan, but also become very risky. Especially in cases where
the coverage rate is below 100%, discontinuity events pose great risks for the members. The preference
for an individual or collective plan in the presence of a discontinuity event, therefore, strongly depends
on the risk preferences of the members. Risk-neutral or risk-seeking members will prefer the collective
plan, while strongly risk-averse members will prefer the individual plan. Please note that the sponsor
(employer) does not share investment risk in either the collective or the individual plan, collective plans
with sponsors that do share risks (sponsor support) will have less volatile replacement rates (Van der
Lecq and Van der Wurff, 2011).
10the actuarial fair contributions are equal to 100% of new entitlements, which forces the coverage rate in the direction
of 100%
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For example, in the last year before discontinuity (N = 179), without further information, we can say
that an individual will be indifferent toward the collective and individual plan if that person has a risk
aversion level of 2.68 (above average (Alserda et al., 2016)). As the collective plan has higher volatility,
this individual will prefer the individual plan if he or she has higher values of risk aversion. After 20
years in discontinuity (N = 200), this value changes to 1.71, which is below average, indicating that more
members will prefer the individual plan. So, pension fund discontinuity decreases the group of members
that are willing to participate in the collective fund, when they have the option to participate in the
individual plan. In this respect, the possibility of a discontinuity event occurring, will make discontinuity
more likely, as more members will choose to leave.
5.4 Sensitivity of institutional factors
So far, the simulation model has shown that discontinuity events are likely to occur. These events will
improve expected replacement rates for the collective plan but also will strongly increase replacement
rate volatility. In this section, we will analyse the occurrence and impact sensitivity of the discontinuity
events on several important pension system characteristics of the pension system, and therefore of the
important inputs to our model11. The findings of the sensitivity analyses are summarized in Table 3.
Table 3: Sensitivity of pension fund discontinuity
Setting Discontinuity risk
Occurrence Impact
Conservative discount Coverage rate is lower, so Higher (implicit) buffer, so
rate more pension cuts and possible discontinuity events have
discontinuity events at starting mostly positive effects due
up period, afterwards, pension to the release of the buffer.
cuts and discontinuity events
become less likely.
Constant contribution No effect, conditional on No effect for collective,
with age balanced population, younger members have paid
relatively too much.
Fixed costs Average costs higher in starting With reduction in the
-up phase, therefore higher number of members costs
probability of discontinuity increases and replacement
event. rates decline.
Unbalanced population Volatility increases, so No effect, conditional on
discontinuity becomes more actuarially fair contributions
likely.
Life expectancy shock Volatility increases, so Replacement rates decrease.
discontinuity more likely.
Discontinuity with – Replacement rates decrease
deficits sharply.
11Varying the (starting) income, retirement age and age of death (larger interval) did not lead to significant changes in
the outcome, expect for making the results less transparent. Therefore, these results are not presented in this paper.
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5.4.1 Discount rate of liabilities
Figure 4 shows the development of the replacement rate when collective liabilities are discounted with
the 30-year risk-free interest rate instead of the expected asset return, which includes an equity premium.
This discount rate is normally lower than the expected return; therefore, the present value of liabilities
increases and the coverage rate decreases. Due to the lower coverage rate, the collective plan will, in this
situation, have more pension cuts in the first years, leading to lower pension benefits (replacement rates),
and finally to higher asset values. As asset returns tend to be higher than the discount rate, an implicit
buffer is created. The return on this buffer increases the coverage rate, which leads to higher pension
benefits.
So, the effect of using a conservative discount rate is that more pension cuts will be applied than necessary,
as in a strong majority of the simulations coverage rates would increase also without pension cuts. This
is especially the case for the first generations. Future generations benefit from this, as there will be more
money available for them (i.e., the part of pensions that is cut, and the return on this), leading to higher
pension benefits. This effect is clearly visible in Figure 4. Replacement rates tend to be lower in the first
80 years but are higher for the generations that retire in later years. The implicit buffer also decreases
the downside risk of the collective plan, which disappears almost completely. The two types of buffers
that are often available in this pension plan (coverage rate above 100% (explicit buffer) and the coverage
rate being conservative (implicit buffer)) imply that members tend to benefit from a discontinuity event
that unlocks these buffers. This might even trigger members to force a discontinuity event when possible,
as this would serve their interest.
This institutional factor, the conservative discount factor, makes discontinuity events less likely because
reported solvency is lower, but the impact much smaller, as the actual solvency tends to increase due
to more previous pension cuts. As the pension funds of the Netherlands case study face such discount
factor, it may explain why discontinuity is not triggered internally, and why discontinuity tends to be
either neutral or positive to the stakeholders.
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Figure 4: Replacement rates in the case of a risk-free discount rate
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Notes. Development of replacement rates from an individual and a collective plan and the median
coverage rate of the collective plan (right axis), including a discontinuity event at year t = 180 (dashes)
and with risk-free discounting and annuitization. Due to the lower discount value, the present value of
liabilities increases, leading to more pension cuts and an implicit higher buffer. This in turn increases
future pensions. As individual plan replacement rates drop, buying an annuity becomes more expensive.
5.4.2 Interest rate individual annuities
So far, the individual pension capitals where converted to an annuity using the expected return. This is
a rather strong assumption, as pension providers in the market will not incorporate both the investment
and longevity risk for free. In Figure 4, the replacement rates following from the individual plan, with
annuities calculated with the risk-free, 30-year interest rate, are presented. As the risk-free interest rate
is lower than the expected return, an annuity will become more expensive. Therefore, the replacement
rates of the individual plan will shift downwards (including the 5%, 50% and 95% percentiles). In this
case, the individual pension plan becomes more unfavourable as compared to the collective pension plan.
Dependent on the specific setting (margin of pension providers), the replacement rate of the individual
plan will be somewhere between these two possibilities. This implies that pension fund members, facing
the trade-off between the collective and the individual plan, will determine their preferences to a large
extent on the interest rate that is used for the annuitization of the capital in the individual plan.
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5.4.3 Constant contribution with age
Figure 5 shows the development of the replacement rate in the case of constant contributions, including
a discontinuity event at year 180. The fixed contribution is set at 15.2%12 of income, which is equal to
the average contribution in our simulations.
Overall, the effect of the constant contribution is limited. The main effect for the collective plan is
that the contribution is higher for the first years, because the average age of members is lower in this
period; therefore, the contribution is higher (compared with progressive contributions). Due to the higher
contributions in the first period, the coverage rate, and thereby the replacement rate, starts at a higher
level and will approach the median path (80% of average income) sooner. Although the effect on the
collective pension plan as a whole is limited, the effect on the members can be large, as there will be a
shift of contributions from members who leave the fund early towards members who enter the fund later
(Van der Lecq and Steenbeek, 2006).
The effects on the individual plan are greater13. As contributions are shifted towards earlier years, the
actuarial value of contributions increases (higher contributions in first years have more time to accrue).
Because of this, the value of retirement benefits increases, and now tends to exceed that of the collective
plan. In the first period, when members retire who became member at an older age (as the pension
fund didn’t exist before), the replacement rate is lower. These members have made relatively lower
contributions, resulting in lower benefits. After discontinuity, the opposite occurs, as more members
retire who became inactive at younger ages due to a discontinuity event. Because of this, the effect of
discontinuity turns around and becomes positive in the median in our simulations.
Having constant contributions instead of progressive contributions results in relatively minor changes for
the collective plan. However, they yield significant changes for individual members who have not been
members during their entire working life and for members of the individual pension plan.
12We do not take change in average age into account.
13Whether this is allowed again depends on the institutional setting of the pension plan.
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Figure 5: Replacement rates with constant contributions
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Notes. Development of replacement rates from an individual and a collective plan and the median coverage
rate of the collective plan (right axis), including a discontinuity event at year t = 180 (dashes) and with
constant contributions. The effect on the collective plan is marginal, while the effect on the individual
plan is large, in line with the members’ ages at entry into and exit from the fund. The actuarial value of
the individual plan increases as contributions are shifted to earlier ages (i.e., longer investment period).
5.4.4 Fixed costs
Figure 6 presents the development of replacement rates in the presence of fixed costs. For this model,
half of the costs14 is assumed to be fixed, both for the collective and individual plan. In both plans,
members are therefore dependent on total fund membership.
Average costs per member are higher in this model for the first and last years, when the number of
members is lower than average. The years in between have more members, and therefore lower average
costs due to economies of scale. Because of this, the coverage and replacement rates are lower in the start-
up period but thereafter exceed those of the baseline model, when the pension fund benefits from lower
costs. In the case a pension fund goes in runoff due to a discontinuity event, total membership gradually
decreases, as members die without new members joining the pension fund. With fewer members, costs
14Calculated as median costs for the years before the discontinuity event, which depend on the number of members and
total assets under management.
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per member increase, and the last members present in the fund are confronted with very high costs,
substantially lowering their pension benefits. However, the effects, in particular that of discontinuity, are
relatively small for the collective plan, due to the presence of positive and negative buffers, which absorb
some of the impact of changing average costs.
For the individual plan, the effect is more pronounced. With fixed costs, the impact of the discontinuity is
far more severe. The entire distribution of replacement rates shifts downwards after discontinuity, as the
remaining members have to incorporate an increasing share of the fixed costs. This makes discontinuity,
particularly in the individual plan, a poor prospect.
Figure 6: Replacement rates with fixed costs
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Notes. Development of replacement rates from an individual and a collective plan and the median
coverage rate of the collective plan (right axis), including a discontinuity event at year t = 180 (dashes)
and with fixed costs. Effects are marginal for the first 180 years, but fixed costs increase the effects of
discontinuity (more volatility). The effect is smaller for the collective fund, due to presence of financial
buffers.
5.4.5 Unbalanced population
In many cases of discontinuity, all members become inactive at the same time. Alternatively, when no
new members join the pension fund, the pension fund will eventually discontinue as well. This might
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happen when new members are no longer willing to join the fund (when participation is not mandatory);
for example, due to the poor coverage rate. In this case, the population will shift towards older members,
as the present members become older without new members joining the pension fund. Table 7 shows the
development of replacement rates in this situation (at year t = 140). The effect is very similar to that
of the discontinuity event assumed thus far (instantly in runoff), but spread out over time. As relatively
more members become inactive / retired, the volatility increases and median replacement rates increase.
Figure 7: Replacement rates with unbalanced population development
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Notes. Development of replacement rates from an individual and a collective plan and the median coverage
rate of the collective plan (right axis), including a alternative discontinuity event at year t = 140 (dashes),
at which point no new members join (but current members remain active). The effect of the discontinuity
event is similar to the other discontinuity event, although the effect is more gradual.
5.4.6 Life expectancy shock
In Figure 8 the replacement rates are presented with an unexpected upward shock in life expectancy (+2
years) at year t = 100. For the individual plan, the cost of the annuity increases, therefore decreasing the
total distribution of replacement rates for new retirees (by 7.4%). This effect is gradually visible after
the unexpected life shock, as new members go into retirement (at which time the annuity is purchased).
Also, the replacement rates of the collective fund decrease. Due to the shock in life expectancy, liabilities
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increase, thus decreasing the coverage rate, which leads to lower benefits. Median replacement rates of the
individual and collective plans become similar and the negative effect of a discontinuity event increases
(lower buffers). As the life expectancy shock will normally be outside of the influence of the pension fund,
and will affect all pension funds similarly, members are more likely to accept to negative consequences
from this event.
Figure 8: Replacement rates with a life expectancy shock
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Notes. Development of replacement rates from an individual and a collective plan and the median coverage
rate of the collective plan (right axis), including a discontinuity event at year t = 180 (dashes) and a life
expectancy shock (+2 years) at year (t = 100 (smaller dashes). Both replacement rates decrease due to
the life expectancy shock, and the impact of discontinuity increases through greater volatility.
5.4.7 Discontinuity with deficits
So far, we have assumed that the discontinuity event was not related to the financial position of the
pension fund (e.g., external trigger). However, as we have shown in Section 5.2, discontinuity events
can also be triggered by the coverage rate, and in these cases there is a strong correlation between the
coverage rate and the discontinuity event. In Figure 9, we present the development of the replacement
rates with a discontinuity event (year t = 180) at which point the coverage rate drops to 85.5% (as
found in Section 5.2). This implies that in the year of discontinuity, pension benefits are instantly cut by
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approximately 1.45% ((100 − 85.5)/10). We do not simulate financial problems for the individual plan,
as by definition, these have 100% solvency.
With a financial shock, the replacement rates substantially shift downwards after the discontinuity event.
In this case, after the discontinuity event, the median replacement rate decreases rather than increases.
The 5% percentile stays relatively stable as these funds were already in financial difficulties. Despite the
fact that the replacement rates tend to decrease after the discontinuity event, approximately 30 years
after discontinuity they start increasing again. At this time, the buffers are restored, due to various
pension cuts, and the continuing members can increasingly benefit from the remaining buffer (in the
median path). Discontinuity events that are related to financial problems lead to lower replacement rates
and higher volatility than discontinuity events that are uncorrelated to the financial position of the fund.
Figure 9: Replacement rates with solvency problems.
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Notes. Development of replacement rates and the median coverage rate (right axis) from a collective plan,
including a discontinuity event at year t = 180 (dashes) at which the coverage rate changes to 85.5%.
This decreases replacement rates in the short run, but for the last members the presence of financial
buffers offsets this effect.
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6 Conclusion
This paper analyses the occurrence and impact of discontinuity events of collective pension funds. Pension
funds are often implicitly assumed to have an infinite lifetime, while in practice that European pension
funds discontinue. Furthermore, discontinuity events are often described as bad events for the actors
involved, but research on the impact of discontinuity events is absent. In addition, discontinuity events
may be strongly linked to the institutional setting; but this relation has not been studied before.
This paper intends to fill these gaps. Using a case study combined with a simulation model, we assess
the occurrence and impact of pension fund discontinuity and the impact of the institutional setting.
We differentiate between four types of discontinuity event triggers. Internal triggers, in contrast to
external triggers, originate from within the pension fund itself. These include a lack of trust in the
fund and low replacement rates. The prime external trigger is the discontinuation of the sponsoring
employer (e.g., bankruptcy). Another distinction is between social and financial triggers. Social triggers
originate from the members; lack of support can make them unwilling to participate in the pension fund.
Financial triggers, like solvency problems, can also force a pension fund into discontinuation. In this case,
the sponsoring company or financial supervisors are more likely to trigger a discontinuity event. These
triggers are closely connected. Financial problems, for example, can make members uncertain about their
future benefits, thus lowering trust, while external financial shocks can force internal financial problems.
The result, however, is the same: The pension fund goes into runoff, all active members become inactive,
and no new members will join the pension fund. The trigger of the discontinuity event is therefore of lesser
importance, although the correlation with the coverage rate (Section 5.4.7) does influence the impact of
the discontinuity event.
The analysis of six pension funds that discontinued shows there is much variation in the start-up situation,
motivation, and continuation choices surrounding pension fund discontinuity. However, discontinuity is
not unilaterally bad for the stakeholders involved, including pension fund members of the collective
pension plans. Most of the cases discussed even showed significant improvements for all the members.
In all cases, discontinuity was caused by an external event outside of the influence of the pension fund.
However, the cases discussed represent pension fund discontinuity in the institutional setting of the
Netherlands, other institutional settings may better allow for internal discontinuity events. Using a
simulation model, we analyse the impact of the institutional setting on pension fund discontinuity.
The results of a long term (250 year) stylized pension fund simulation model shows that internal disconti-
nuity events are likely to occur within the horizon of our simulations, with discontinuity events occurring
more often due to lack of membership support than financial problems, although both are strongly con-
nected. However, in line with the results of the case study, our model shows that discontinuity is not
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necessarily bad for pension fund members. The riskiness of the replacement rate tends to increase after
a discontinuity event, but the same is true for the median replacement rate. Whether a discontinuity
event is considered bad for a member, therefore, depends on his/her risk aversion and on the institutional
setting of his/her pension fund. This poses a trade-off in the design of the pension system. Institutional
factors influence both the perceived and actual financial position of the pension fund, but not necessarily
to the same extend or in the same direction. Stricter regulations for example, increase the financial
stability of the pension fund, but lower the perceived position of the fund. This makes discontinuity
more likely, as the perceived financial position is lower, and members and sponsors will be sooner inclined
to discontinue the pension fund, but reduces the impact of discontinuity, because the actual financial
position will normally increase (e.g., due to higher pension cuts in the past).
Sensitivity analyses show that when pensions use conservative discount rates, the impact of discontinuity
events improves due to higher (implicit) buffers. The presence of fixed costs deteriorates the effect of
discontinuity due to higher average costs when the number of members decline. A population that is either
unbalanced, or which faces a rise in life expectancy, results in more volatile pension benefits and higher
occurrence of discontinuity events. Constant contributions, as opposed to progressive contributions, have
redistributive effects within the population but do not significantly alter discontinuity risk.
The replacement rate of the collective plan tends to surpass that of the individual plan, although the
latter is in most cases less volatile. The on average positive buffer (i.e., surplus) increases expected
benefits for future retirees. However, the risk that the collective plan presents for a member to start in a
situation with a deficit, increases downside risk. Of course, this can be corrected by adjusting the asset
allocation; however, this falls outside the scope of this research. The individual pension plan is especially
sensitive to the rules concerning the annuitization of pension capital at retirement age. If annuitization
is mandatory and based on the risk-free interest rate, the collective pension plan is practically superior
to the individual plan. The main advantages of the collective plan are the options of spreading defects
and surpluses and the possibility of continuing to invest during retirement.
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7 Discussion
The analysis in this paper shows that discontinuity events are not necessarily bad to pension fund members
but that their impact strongly depends on the specific setting of a discontinuity event. In this paper, we
have used a case study and a stylized model to describe pension fund discontinuity. Including more of the
real life complexity in the (mostly country- specific) model will change the exact impact of discontinuity.
We will discuss some of these factors here.
For individual plans, we have assumed a single pension plan with a single asset allocation that does not
change within our horizon. Individual plans may have particular value by allowing for customizing the
plan to individual preferences and time to retirement (i.e., lifecycles). The value of the individual plan
(compared with the collective plan) will therefore be more attractive than in our model (see, for example,
Alserda et al. (2016)).
In our model, we constantly correct for inflation to deal with the long time horizon. Therefore, the results
represent the purchasing power of pension fund members, which in our opinion will be most relevant for
the members. However, many countries use nominal coverage rates and focus on nominal replacement
rates. This may change pension fund behaviour (e.g., focusing less on inflation hedging).
As the analysis shows, we cannot assume that discontinuity events are either unilaterally bad or good
for pension fund members. The analysis of six pension funds that have discontinued showed that the
availability of continuation options may abate the impact of discontinuity risk. However, these six cases
were active in the same institutional setting of the Netherlands), and results may be different for other
institutional settings. The analysis of the impact of discontinuity events, following our discussion of the
sensitivity of the institutional setting, should always be related to the specific setting of the pension
system under scrutiny, taking institutional factors into account.
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